INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, virtually all sections of the Irish trade union movement were suffering, albeit to varying degrees, from the most sustained and serious losses in trade union membership recorded since the 1920s (Roche, 1997) .
Rising unemployment levels and falling union membership, as well as a mounting national fiscal crisis, provided a context for the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) to seek a return to centralised bargaining. This has resulted in the conclusion of a series of tripartite social pacts (seven at the time of writing) since 1987. 1 As a result, the government and various state agencies have gained direct influence over pay determination in the economy, while the state has effectively 'co-opted' federations of unions and employers into the process of governance (O'Donnell and Thomas, 1998) . At a macro level, the national agreements to date have coincided with unprecedented economic success. Employment levels have increased dramatically, real increases in disposable income were delivered while keeping industrial conflict at low levels, tax reform has been embarked upon, and the national finances were transformed (Hardiman, 2004) . The contents of the agreements have been progressively expanded, from an early focus simply on the questions of pay and tax reform, to the plethora of issues that now feature (migration, waste management, alcohol/drug misuse, housing policy, etc.).
Social partnership has, therefore, for two decades, provided the framework within which Irish industrial relations (IR) have been conducted. While much literature has focused on the macro picture (particularly the economics of social partnership) from the perspectives of the state, employers and the trade union movement, the voice of the ordinary union member has been heard but faintly; basically, only in relation to the results of the ballots on whether to accept or reject the latest deal. Evidence of the satisfaction or otherwise of ordinary union members with the process has been virtually non-existent (cf.
D 'Art and Turner, 2002) . The aim of this article is to investigate the perceptions of the partnership process amongst ordinary members at workplace level and assess the implications of these perceptions for the union-member relationship.
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PARTNERSHIP AND UNION MEMBERS
Union members, for various reasons, might be expected to welcome a partnership strategy. Firstly, recent national research shows that Irish union members increasingly prioritise a 'collaborative union posture' (Geary, 2006: 108; see also O' Connell et al., 2004) . The incidence of industrial action has declined in Ireland in recent years, a phenomenon that had been observed in most European countries (Waddington and Hoffman, 2000) , and old 'adversarial' industrial relations have been castigated as destructive and irrelevant in the context of intensified global competition (Kelly, 1996) . Thus, as employees are less willing or likely to engage in collective action, a 2 Note that this article is concerned solely with data on perceptions of the impact of the national partnership agreements. The national agreements from 1996 on have encouraged the development of partnership structures and processes at the level of the workplace. The evidence suggests that the diffusion of workplace partnership, as conceived of in the national agreements, has been quite limited (O' Connell et al., 2004) . It is most advanced in the public sector, and workplace partnership structures were present in the local authority in which this research was partly conducted. However, the two processes are distinct and the interviews with local authority staff revealed a clear appreciation of the distinction. The survey questions on partnership, too, clearly specified information was being sought on the national partnership process.
partnership strategy geared towards consensual employment relations reflects the demands of the contemporary workforce and may reduce the negative image that associates trade unions with militancy and conflict (Cohen and Hurd, 1998) .
One the main potential benefits of a national partnership strategy for unions might be an enhanced institutional role that provides access to power resources (Frege and Kelly, 2004) . Greater interaction between union leaders and key representatives from government and business can also result in increased trust between the parties (Teague, 2001 ). In the Irish context, the social partnership agreements emerged around the formula of offering pay moderation for tax concessions, but the process has developed whereby the state now agrees to address broader supply side issues (training, infrastructure, health, housing) in conjunction with the social partners and to reform social and welfare policy. Trade unions, therefore, can gain influence over a broader range of issues that affect members' working lives and expand the bargaining agenda beyond the traditional concerns of workplace pay and conditions (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004) .
In terms of pay, a corporatist strategy may find approval with union members who appreciate the 'big picture'; i.e. who appreciate the benefits for the economy as a whole of a broader, coordinated bargaining strategy (Goetschy, 2000) . This is particularly important for unions and their members given the dynamics of a global economy, the growth of trans-national capital and the increasing power of such capital to 'take flight' (Streeck, 1999) , which has arguably resulted in escalating pressure, particularly on smaller states, to adopt a coordinated approach to socio-economic management (Auer, 2000) .
Finally, nationally bargained pay agreements generally seek to ensure greater equity in the distribution of pay increases across the economy (ibid.).
Irish social partnership, however, with its high-level political exchange between union elites, employers and government, may be viewed as having negative effects on the union-member relationship. Firstly, wage restraint or moderation (a key plank of the process has traditionally been the exchange of pay moderation for tax reform) for some rank-and-file members may appear contrary to the raison d'ětre of trade unions (D'Art and Turner, 2002) .
Secondly, with the tendency under bargained corporatism for power to shift towards the union centre, local union activity may dwindle or, at least, be less visible to members. This could undermine the degree of articulation of the union regime and result in a detachment of union officials, who represent the union on national partnership bodies, from local representatives and ordinary union members; what Geary and Roche (2003) refer to as the 'displaced activist' thesis.
A further problem may be members' perceptions that the union has 'sold out', as union leaders are co-opted by employers and the state. It has been argued, at least in the early days of the process, that Irish 'developmental corporatism', far from being an experiment in the 'social corporatism' of countries like Sweden and Austria, with the attendant social and labour market objectives, amounted to little more than unions agreeing to a programme of severe measures to adjust the Irish economy first to fiscal crisis and then to European integration (Teague, 1995) 3 . Thus, corporatism might be viewed as leading to a downgrading of membership-led and resistance strategies, an undermining of workplace activism, and a long-term weakening of union structures (D'Art and Turner, 2002; Stuart and Martίnez Lucio, 2005) .
Before assessing these arguments in light of empirical evidence on the impact of a partnership strategy on the union-member relationship, the organisations researched and the methods used in the study will be described. Resources-HR-department). Organisational structures in Drimeen LA are relatively hierarchical and bureaucratic, particularly in terms of staff career progression (seniority remains key), and employees enjoy extremely high levels of employment security. However recent developments reflect attempts to introduce more 'consumerist' principles to local authority work organisation (OECD, 1995) . Increasingly, work in the sector is characterised by flexibility and diversity. A particular facet of employment in Drimeen LA (as in local government in Ireland generally) is its 'family friendly' and non-standard nature (e.g. job-sharing, part-time work), and the promotion of equality (and especially gender equality) in the workplace features prominently (Wickham et al., 2005) . This explains, to a significant degree, the fact that the Drimeen workforce is mostly populated by females.
THE CASE STUDY ORGANISATIONS
IMPACT, formed in 1991 through the amalgamation of three unions, is Ireland's largest public and civil services trade union, with a membership of over fifty thousand. The membership of the 'indoor' local government branch of IMPACT is white-collar, predominantly female and almost exclusively made up of indigenous workers. Industrial action among indoor staff is historically rare; the union generally tends to pursue issues through the State's dispute resolution machinery. As a public service organisation, negotiations around pay and conditions have generally been handled at central, national level (with the Department of Finance a key player; Wallace et al., 2004) and this has continued with the partnership process. At local level, industrial relations have traditionally been conducted in a rather adversarial manner. However, more recently workplace partnership has been seen as a key initiative for local government to pursue. IMPACT has been an enthusiastic supporter of the national partnership process and the union has endorsed all seven agreements to date. As with SIPTU, the union was seen as having significant influence (both formally and informally) with significant government players.
The ongoing key issue facing unions in local government is the roll out of the Performance Management Development System (PMDS) which is to introduce ongoing employee reviews, and a greater use of competitive, meritbased promotion systems. This explicitly links pay rises with performance, as all pay rises in Sustaining Progress were linked to the verification of a detailed modernisation and change agenda, which was agreed as part of the pay deal.
Also, as work organisation in the sector has become characterised by a high degree of flexibility, a key role for the union lies in negotiating and implementing various family-friendly policies.
Darbco is one of the world's leading retail operators and entered the Irish market in the 1990s, becoming one of the sector's largest employers. The case study store opened in 1989 (although it was not at the time owned by Darbco). There are roughly one hundred and seventy employees; no breakdown was available for the full-time/part-time split, but given the nature of the retail industry it is safe to say a considerable proportion are part-time.
As in most modern, large-scale retail outlets (management aside) there are basically three areas of staff activity; customer advice and service, goods handling, and checkouts and the respondents were a mix of all three groups.
Pay grades in the company are linked to tenure of employment; staff turnover in the retail sector tends to be high (Caprile, 2004) The main trade union representing workers in the retail sector is MANDATE, which has about thirty six thousand members. MANDATE was formed (following a merger) in 1994. Given the sectors in which it operates, MANDATE has a membership that is predominantly female and a relatively large number of members work part-time (approximately seventy per cent according to union officials). Given the tendency in the retail sector for firms to compete fiercely on cost, and the sector's adversarial industrial relations tradition (Caprile, 2004) , the union has also been to the forefront in Ireland in terms of taking industrial action, with some prolonged and bitter recent disputes, including one with Darbco in the early part of the decade. At that stage IR conditions were desperately poor but, soon after, Darbco introduced a new HR team and, more recently, both sides have tried to pursue a more co-operative relationship.
Since its inception in 1994, MANDATE has often been characterised as an 'anti national agreement' union (Caprile, 2004) , has consistently argued that percentage increases, such as those granted under the partnership agreements, are of little value to its members and has sought special provisions for low-paid workers. Consequently, the union has consistently voted against partnership agreements, apart from the first agreement, the National financial markets, previously protected by extensive regulation, have been opened up to international competition and banks have been exposed to new forms of price and cost pressure (Regini et al, 1999) . As with retail, nonstandard work patterns are on the increase in banking organisations (due to the expansion of business hours, for example). Migrant workers in the sector tend to come from other EU, or 'Anglo-Saxon', countries and tend to be highskilled workers.
The IBOA has not been noted as a particularly 'militant' union and, at least until recently, has been an enthusiastic supporter of social partnership (the IBOA joined ICTU in 1993). Sustaining Progress, however, was overwhelmingly rejected by the union's membership. A watershed moment for many in the union (and, indeed, at People's Bank) was a major national strike in 1992 (during which thousands of members were expelled for breaking IBOA directives). It seems until that point, most middle and many senior managers were also members of the union, but many left at that point, and the position subsequently is less clear-cut in relation to managers' union affiliation.
As can be seen from the above, then, the workplaces chosen for this research, while all unionised, reflect different types of organisation with different organisational goals and interests, and different types of employees with quite different work based concerns. Together, however, the workplaces are characterised by features that are crucial to understanding the contemporary trade union-member relationship. The overarching characteristic of these (as indeed, arguably, of all) workplaces is that they are, and have been, facing rapid change. The private sector workplaces are owned by parent MNCs (so unions must take cognisance of the dangers of such capital 'taking flight') and operate in fiercely competitive international markets. In the public sector, issues of deregulation, performance benchmarking, and 'value for money' in the provision of public services are key. All the organisations are increasingly focused on the need for 'flexibility' in employment relations (for example, through greater use of part-time work, and differentiated working hours) which results in concerns about work intensification and 'family friendly' work organisation. The changing nature of work and work patterns is reflected in the growing heterogeneity of the workforce, with greater participation by female, young, and migrant workers.
RESEARCH METHOD
As is common in case study research, a multi-method approach was adopted.
A series of semi-structured interviews were carried out and a questionnaire was devised and distributed to respondents. Non-participant observation was possible in Bus Company and Darbco and for all four workplaces documentary materials on the companies, unions and workplaces were collated, and key informants (drawn from both union and management) were identified. In addition to the perspective of the union members themselves, information was sought from the 'official union' (elected workplace representatives, paid union officials), and the company (managers, HR representatives).
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Assurances of confidentiality were given to all participants. 6 The main qualitative research (the semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis and direct observation) was carried out during day-long visits (ranging from three to five occasions) to the workplaces. At each workplace the initial visit consisted of interviews with the local union representative and a management and/or human resource representative. At the end of these, the 5 Attempts to gain access to People's Bank central management or HR proved fruitless; a key informant at the case study location (a senior line manager) authorised the researcher's presence at that workplace. 6 All the names of respondents, organisations and places used are pseudonyms. Permission to identify the trade unions was granted.
respondents were asked to each suggest employees to be interviewed (the intention, obviously, being to attempt to avoid bias in the sample). Each interviewee, in turn, was asked to similarly nominate another possible candidate ('snowballing').
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All employees were interviewed at their place of work (the staff canteen, social area, or in vacant offices). Union officials and company central management were interviewed at the union or company head office.
In all, fifty nine qualitative interviews were conducted, tape recorded and transcribed. These ranged in duration from around forty minutes (the bulk of the interviews with ordinary union members) to two hours (some of the key informant interviews with union officials and HR representatives). These consisted of forty one interviews with ordinary union members (nine bus drivers, twelve retail workers, ten bank workers, and ten local authority The questionnaire was administered at the end of the research period. For practical reasons (time and cost) and due to the fact the workplaces varied in the numbers of those employed, the aim was to distribute one hundred questionnaires in each workplace. 8 Darbco, having initially agreed to cooperate with the research, expressed misgivings about the survey questionnaire, and the level of detail contained therein. Eventually, the company agreed to allow fifty copies be distributed.
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In all, three hundred and sixty surveys were distributed (one hundred in each workplace bar Darbco).
One hundred and twenty nine responses were received, giving a response rate of thirty six per cent 10 . The study, therefore, is relatively small-scale and any generalisation is not primarily about the typicality of the organisations, but the existence of particular processes, which may influence behaviours and actions in the organisations.
PAY AND INDUSTRIAL PEACE
Across the four workplaces there was agreement amongst virtually all FullTime Officers (FTOs) and workplace representatives that the partnership process had benefited members in terms of pay. The only equivocal voices were the two MANDATE officials, who felt that the agreements were of little benefit to members in low-paid industries, like retail. Interestingly the workplace representative had a different view:
'I think partnership is probably better than the free collective bargaining because everybody just goes off looking for more and more then…I'm not saying we shouldn't get paid, we want a pay rise but we don't want to push the company so far…You could just cut your nose off to spite your face and put yourself out of work' (Liam, MANDATE workplace representative).
At the core of Liam's view is the desirability of industrial stability. This was stressed by most of the workplace representatives. For the latter, the removal of the wages issue from local negotiations also meant the removal of the most contentious local agenda item:
'A lot of contentious issues, like your wages, are taken out of your hands now. One of the main reasons for going on strike would be your wages, you know? So, that's not an issue when it's done on a national level' (Donal, SIPTU workplace representative) Union members across the four workplaces were asked a number of survey questions about the impact of social partnership. As can be seen from Table   1 , survey respondents were strongly of the view that pay and conditions for workers had improved as a result of the partnership agreements. The interview data also, interestingly, revealed significant appreciation by ordinary members of the desirability of industrial stability:
'When the unions in this company and in other companies were doing their own thing, breaking away and having ballots and having stoppages, they held to country to actual ransom. That doesn't happen anymore because everybody is part of one big club' (Dominic, SIPTU member).
An interesting observation by some of the higher-paid financial services employees was that the national pay deals promoted equity:
'I'm all in favour of protecting the weak…ok, it (centralised pay bargaining) penalises the strong but, say you're going to get fifteen per cent of an increase through partnership. If you're good it's quite easy to get twenty per cent, but if you're bad it's very hard to get fifteen' (Eoghan, IBOA member).
Across the workplaces, then, there was broad agreement among members, workplace representatives and (most) officials on the success of the partnership process in terms of pay outcomes. This seems to question the criticism of partnership/corporatism that focuses on wage moderation at 'top' level being resisted on the ground (D' Art and Turner, 2002) . This might well reflect the view that members have a more sophisticated understanding of the arguments for wage moderation, and the links with other claims, than is often thought, and appreciate the benefits of a broader, coordinated bargaining strategy (Goetschy, 2000) . The references to the desirability of industrial stability and the role of partnership in promoting that seem to support this view. As noted above, the organisational context for these workers was one of rapid change (possible deregulation, takeover, organisational restructuring etc). In such circumstances, it may be that partnership is seen as a 'safety net' of sorts.
INFLUENCE, UNION POWER, AND THE 'BROADER AGENDA'
As noted above, one of the potential benefits of a partnership strategy is the opportunity for the union movement to better institutionalise its position in social, economic and political life and to gain influence over a broader range of issues affecting members' working lives. This was alluded to by most of the respondent FTOs, particularly those representing members in the two public sector workplaces. One advantage of the process was mentioned in relation to union influence over the decisions of key state agencies. An example given was the granting of contracts for road building by the National Roads Authority:
'We'd know who's in to tender for those, we would have made contact and met them, and made sure that we had an agreement with them that they would be unionised and sub-contractors would be unionised' Opinion on this issue was more divided among the private sector FTOs. One MANDATE official stressed the advantages of being 'at the table' in relation to strategic issues relevant to the retail trade. One example given was in relation to the issue of immigrant workers in the sector:
'I think we've convinced the Minister during the national pay talks that the permit system has been widely abused by a lot of employers'
(emphasis added).
However, other officials were not so convinced and expressed reservations about the motives of both employers and, intriguingly, the State for entering the partnership process: And what government wants is industrial peace and they don't give a damn much after that what happens to anybody. So we don't all want the same things…If we all wanted (partnership) on a "what kind of a society do we want to build?" approach, rather than the system that says "well, give them another three per cent if it shuts them up", it might work a little bit better' (Eric, MANDATE official).
In both case, the officials doubted the bona fides of the other social partners, and felt that the process was being used by employers and the State primarily to manage levels of industrial conflict rather than to genuinely address, through partnership, broader concerns about macro socio-economic policy. It is interesting to note that such views were not expressed to the same degree by the public sector union representatives.
The union officials were also asked for their view of members' perceptions of the partnership process. The responses were generally quite negative. The officials from SIPTU and MANDATE felt that the process had not been beneficial for the union-member relationship:
'I do think that centralised bargaining has damaged involvement to a great extent. I mean, every three years you get a bit of paper and you stick "yes" or you stick "no" on it, as most of our members do, and you hop it in the box. And to a great extent that's the height of your involvement with social partnership' (Eric, MANDATE official).
A related issue was that of the non-pay elements of the social partnership agreements (the extremely extensive 'social provisions', for example). Again, officials felt that the value of these was not appreciated by the membership, although the officials did themselves recognise some failure on their part to effectively 'sell' the broader social elements of the partnership process to members. This aspect seems one of the key complexities at the heart of how partnership has impacted on the union member relationship. As Table 2 shows, a clear majority of employees across the four workplaces felt that the union movement did have a greater role in influencing state social and economic policy as a result of the process (although there is a high number of 'undecided' respondents). This is a key question as part of the rationale for unions entering a partnership process is to enhance their institutional security and expand the bargaining agenda. However, what the interview data revealed is that, outside of the pay element, the majority of respondents had very little knowledge of the role of partnership in addressing key issues of concern to their working lives. As noted above these workplaces all face both common, and certain distinctive, challenges.
Under Part Two of Sustaining Progress (the agreement on which respondents were being, or just had been, balloted at the time of the research) section 6 deals with housing, section 10 with workplace legislation and codes (including atypical work), sections 11 and 12 deal with the gender pay gap and work/life balance, section 18 deals with migrant workers and sections 20-26 deal with public sector reform. These were all issues of importance for these workplaces and respondents, yet virtually none of the latter was aware that such issues were being addressed through the partnership process at all (much less in the agreement on which they were voting).
11
To take one example, most of the respondents made reference to the high cost of housing as something that impacted on their working lives (because they were forced into long commutes, for example). Many of the female (and some of the male) respondents referred to the high cost of childcare. The respondents' confusion as to the role of partnership is neatly illustrated by this female IMPACT member:
'There's a big housing crisis. There are loads of other issues like childcare, which to me, don't really have anything to do with, well maybe they do, I don't know, with the actual percentage increases. As well, there's the Performance Related Pay. I don't know how that's going to be implemented'.
The whole area of performance related pay and PMDS in the public sector had been negotiated as part of the overall pay package, yet none of the local authority respondents was aware of this fact.
One area where ordinary SIPTU members, however, were quite conscious of the, as they saw it, failings of the process was in relation to transport policy. 'We're not happy with the union, because they've delayed the strike, which I think is stupid. They have the backing of the whole garage.
Unfortunately, there are certain guidelines (on taking strike action) that you have to take from the PPF agreements' (Harry, SIPTU member).
Finally, a related feature of the lack of knowledge of the non-pay elements of the partnership agreements was the association by a minority of respondents of the union movement with a (somewhat discredited) 'establishment'. The potential problem of the 'official' union (and in particular its full-time officers)
becoming incorporated into, and associated with, the social networks of employers, state agencies and the middle classes (lawyers, bankers etc) is by no means new (Kelly and Heery, 1994) but is probably heightened under a corporatist framework. Thus, a minority of respondents responded to questions about partnership by quickly segueing into complaints about the government, the State, and others:
'I would also strongly criticise the government for their waste…the builders, the property developers, the banks and the government. Stamp duty. VAT. The cost of the tribunals. There's 21% VAT on the lawyers fees. …So, social partnership me arse' (Carla, MANDATE member).
CONCLUSION
The data here reveal quite a complex interaction between the social partnership process and the union-member relationship. Broadly speaking, union members in this research (across all four workplaces) were favourably disposed towards partnership as a union strategy. This was particularly true in terms of pay outcomes, the role of partnership in promoting more stable, peaceable employment relations and the benefits of a co-ordinated approach to macro socio-economic policy, that links wage moderation with job creation and retention. Members also felt the process had resulted in more trade union influence over socio-economic policy. However, the data also show that the vast majority of members had very little knowledge of what I have termed the 'broader agenda' aspect of partnership; outside of pay and industrial conflict, members had little understanding of other policy aspects of the process, even where (in areas like childcare, housing, public sector reform, etc) these were issues of concern that had a significant impact on their working lives. Union workplace representatives, too, were by and large positive about the process and welcomed the removal of contentious items (most obviously, pay) from the local bargaining agenda.
Given this it is interesting to reflect on the fact that in three of these workplaces (the exception being the local authority) members voted, around the time of the research, to reject Sustaining Progress.
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The key explanation for this in the private sector workplaces would, it is submitted, seem to be found in the stance of the official union. In both Darbco and People's Bank the respective unions recommended a 'no' vote.
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In both cases, union officials (and in the latter case, the workplace representative) indicated a significant reason for the recommendation related to the 'binding arbitration' aspect of 12 Information on the precise voting outcomes in the four workplaces was unavailable; however, MANDATE, the IBOA and the Bus Company branch of SIPTU (in the latter case, the information comes from the FTOs) all overwhelmingly rejected the agreement, with 'no' votes of between ninety and ninety five per cent. It is reasonable to infer (see note 13) that voting patterns in these workplaces did not deviate significantly from the overall pattern. 13 More than half of interview respondents in each workplace indicated they would usually follow the union recommendation when voting. However, this does not explain why union leaders have not been able to outline to members the potential benefits, or indeed weaknesses, of many of the non-pay partnership provisions outlined above. The interviews with union officials, even those relatively supportive of the process, seemed to indicate unease with how they felt the process was viewed by members. It seems odd, though, for union officials to bemoan the members' lack of engagement with the partnership process, while making little attempt to explain it more fully.
The officials' unease seems misplaced in relation to these workplaces, as the data indicate that members (and to a lesser, but still significant extent, workplace representatives) are relatively comfortable with a partnership strategy. This may suggest an interesting inversion of the classic corporatist critique, and raises questions as to the extent to which, on the partnership issue, the leaders of these unions are responding to the preferences of their membership.
